Watered-down commission to oversee police force

To date, the National Police Commission (NPC) has not yet been established, even though Presidential Decree No. 17/2005 on the NPC was signed on Feb. 7, 2005. Based on this decree, the selection committee that is chaired by Gen. (ret) Awaloeddin Djamin has submitted 12 names of candidates to the National Police chief, who forwarded the list to the President in August 2005. The 12 names were selected from 187 applicants.

Chapter III, article 12, point 3 of the Presidential Decree stipulates that the President has the final say to decide the six candidates for the commission. They comprise public figures and police experts. Apart from these six, three ex-officio representing the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, the Home Affairs Ministry and Justice and Human Rights Ministry will sit on the commission.

With three government representatives seated on the commission, public sentiment is such that the institution would not be independent.

When I held a series of meetings to reach out to the public regarding the commission in Medan , Makassar and Jakarta between May and June 2005, the participants expressed doubt over the independence of the commission due to the presence of government officials.

In addition, the commission was also seen as not powerful enough. According to Law No. 22/2002 on the National Police, chapter VI, the tasks of the commission will include assisting the President to draft policy and provide advice on the appointment and termination of the National Police chief. The authorities of the commission include data collection and analysis as a basis for recommendations to President regarding budget, human resource development and equipment. They also offer suggestions to the President on a professional and self-reliant police force, as well as to gather suggestions and complaints from the public about police performance.

In short, the commission will play an advisory role and serve as a complaint board instead of an institution with the power to investigate, detect and take necessary actions against police personnel who commit abuse of power, an equivalent of the Corruption Eradication Commission and the National Commission or Human Rights in terms of authority.

Apart from those weaknesses, the selection process itself lacks transparency. The public is in the dark about the 12 candidates who are currently under the President’s scrutiny. If the committee has publicly announced the candidates, the public would provide feedback regarding the candidates’ track records. The President will then have enough information whenever he or she wants to shortlist the candidates. The selection committee deems that technical considerations outweigh the importance of the willingness to implement good governance principles.

The Judicial Commission is more interesting than the NPC as its candidates underwent scrutiny at the House of Representatives (DPR). The Judicial Commission was set up based on a law while the NPC, as well as the Prosecutor’s Commission, on a presidential decree.

The question now is why we need a police oversight body? Haven’t we facilitated external and internal control mechanisms?

Internally, the police force has a special oversight unit, known as the Division of Police Professionalism and Control, while the external control comes from the House of Representatives (DPR).

Internal mechanisms, however, have not been effective in improving police performance. Former police chief Gen. (ret) Chairuddin Ismail said that a built-in control mechanism was necessary, but not sufficient to break the prevailing solidarity and nontransparent culture of the police. Neither was the external control from House, because public hearings with the National Police chief often failed to find the real problems.

In a democracy, external control over government institutions is necessary to apply checks and balances. The police force, as a civilian institution, has extraordinary powers mandated by law, such as the use of weapons, carrying out investigations and making arrests. Given these powers, and in the absence of an effective oversight body, corruption and abuse of power will prevail.

A study from students at the PTIK ( Police Staff College ) revealed that corruption, collusion and nepotism are rampant within every unit of the police force. This holds true in the criminal and investigation unit, the security intelligence unit, the traffic unit, personnel development unit and the resource management unit (Polri and Corruption Issues, Partnership 2004). One clear example of this is the involvement of an active general, Suyitno Landung, former chief of detectives, in the BNI 46 bank embezzlement scandal.

In other countries like Britain and Japan , the police oversight institutions are entirely independent, and undertake control mechanisms to prevent the police from abusing power, especially violations of law and human rights.

Based on this logic, the presence of a Police Commission as an external body is necessary for the proper checks and balances on the police. Unfortunately, this country is reluctant to produce a strong commission that helps prevent abuses of power by the brown-shirted brigade. It is possible that the President will postpone the establishment of the commission after considering public criticism. The President may not be confident enough to establish the commission, and therefore, it needs to be stressed that the commission will play an essential role to help develop a clean, accountable and professional police force.

Although the weaknesses of the commission’s framework are understood, the President should be encouraged to establish the commission. Greater authority for the commission must be granted by amending Law No. 2/2002.

The writer is a Program Manager with the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia . He can be reached at sofyan.lubis.

Sofyan LubisProgram Manager with the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia